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The present study investigates the impact of the privatization process on a sample 
of 125 privatized European companies, during the period 2001-2011. We compare 
company performance before and after the privatization process and evaluate the impact 
of changes in private shareholding on the performance of the privatized companies. 
Additionally, we investigate how different combinations of private participation and state 
participation influence company performance. 
We find that privatized companies reveal superior performance in the period after 
the privatization process and that increases in private participation have a positive impact 
in company performance. The results also show that there seems to be an optimal 
combination between state participation and private investment that maximizes company 
performance. 




















O presente estudo investiga o impacto do processo de privatização numa amostra 
de 125 empresas Europeias privatizadas, durante o período de 2001-2011. Comparamos 
o desempenho das empresas antes e depois do processo de privatização e avaliamos o 
impacto de mudanças na participação privada no desempenho das empresas privatizadas. 
Adicionalmente, investigamos como diferentes combinações de participação privada e 
participação do Estado influenciam o desempenho das empresas. 
Os resultados mostram que as empresas privatizadas revelam um desempenho 
superior no período posterior ao processo de privatização e que o aumento da participação 
dos privados tem um impacto positivo no desempenho das empresas. Os resultados 
mostram também que parece haver uma combinação ótima entre a participação do Estado 














1 – Introduction 
 
We are currently witnessing a wave of financial assistance programs in Europe. 
Given the difficulty of some countries to fulfill their financial commitments, privatization 
of public enterprises is one of the items in the agenda. We can find some examples of this 
situation in Portugal or Greece where a memorandum has been singed between national 
institutions and international European authorities. This brings back an old debate in the 
European society, with valid arguments for and against privatizations. Efficiency gains 
have been pointed out as an advantage of this process (Boubakri and Cosset, 1998), while 
market power exploitation has been presented as a disadvantage (La Porta and Lopez-de-
Silanes, 1999). The present study intends to provide additional insights to this debate. 
This study seeks to examine the relationship between the privatization process of 
state owned companies and their performance. Empirical literature has provided evidence 
that privately owned firms perform better than state owned companies, which in turn has 
been one of the arguments in favor of selling state shares (Gupta, 2005). Given the current 
sovereign debt crisis Europe is facing, European countries provide a perfect laboratory 
for analyzing the efficiency of privatization processes. It’s interesting that Europe, most 
important representative of welfare state policies, becomes involved in such an intense 
debate about sustainability of its own model. Given the present crisis, we could question 
the sustainability of state intervention in the economy, as most of the southern countries 
have welfare policies that are unrealistic when compared to the level of wealth they create. 
This mismatch will inevitably lead to an unsustainable level of public debt. Actually, in 
most European countries economic growth seems unable to sustain social commitments 
made to their citizens. The role of public enterprises is of great importance to this debate. 




necessity seems to provide us a framework that justifies the relevance and opportunity of 
this study. 
This study compares public and private sector, to clarify the context involving the 
Business Manager and the key variables to be taken into consideration for the decision 
process, and consequently the success of the organization. Managing a state owned 
company appears to require a different set of criteria from those followed by a private 
sector company, especially regarding shareholder’s objectives, financial management and 
employees’ perception and motivation (Gupta and Dinc, 2011). Furthermore, it is in 
businesses and tax payer’s best interest that state intervention in the economy is studied 
and monitored. This intervention is crucial for employment and for private sector 
decisions, as state owned companies usually are important players in the market and are 
responsible for a considerable number of jobs (Gupta and Dinc, 2011). Most importantly 
this intervention is crucial in its application of public resources. At the end of the day, 
results of this application determines the state’s financial needs, in turn determining the 
level of taxation that is imposed to society. 
The present study relies on public information, namely firms’ financial statements, 
in order to perform a comparative analysis of business performance in state owned firms 
that where subsequently sold to private owners. This comparative exercise is based on a 
set of financial indicators that aim to represent the different features that compose a 
company's performance and the way these features change throughout a privatization 
process. Particularly, the performance of a set of privatized firms is compared with the 
performance of state owned firms. The results obtained in the present study provide strong 
evidence that state owned firms perform better after the privatization process since they 
confirm that companies have better performance after privatization. The results also show 




combination between private and state participation that maximizes company 
performance. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In the following chapter, we 
review the relevant literature. The third chapter identifies the problem by defining the 
hypotheses raised by this study. Chapter four addresses data that supports our analysis 
and methodology is presented in chapter five. We discuss the results in chapter six and 

























2 – Literature Review 
Theory on this subject argues that the privatization process has a positive influence 
on the efficiency of privatized firms. This relationship seems to be explained by existing 
differences between the objectives of privatized companies and objectives of state owned 
companies (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). When a company is controlled by the state, 
objectives are established seeking to maximize a combination of social welfare and the 
personal agenda of the minister, politician or government bureaucrat who controls it. This 
personal agenda can be determined by different factors like favoring specific interest 
groups, aiming to high wages and high employment levels in specific firms or specific 
sectors, or be subject to patronage pressure that requires returns for the previously granted 
political support. When a company is controlled by private investors, objectives are set 
according to a profit maximization perspective, which can also constitute in itself a 
component of social welfare (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). Between these two opposing 
perspectives lies one of the reasons for the difference between the efficiency of state 
owned enterprises and private enterprises, since strategies for improving business 
performance necessarily require restructuring measures and resource optimization. These 
measures can turn out to be very unpopular for any politician (Gupta and Dinc, 2011).  
Additionally, the privatization process contributes to change the means of 
monitoring managerial behavior. The possibility of transferring the property rights 
acquired by private investors may lead to market pressure. This pressure reveals 
information because of the need to establish prices for those property rights. These prices 
should reflect the possibility of current decisions becoming future profits, thus evaluating 
management decisions (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). Another kind of monitoring 




bankruptcy. Privatized firms no longer have the shelter provided by state protection that 
subsidizes loss-making activities with taxpayer money when necessary. These companies 
are now subject to a competitive environment that facilitates performance comparisons 
but also requires an increase in productive efficiency for the companies to be able to 
survive (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991).  
In Table I we present a summary of the main studies on this subject and its main 
conclusions. The time period of the study, the methodology and the geographic context 
from where the sample was collected, are also presented. Overall the studies report 
performance improvements for partially privatized and fully privatized companies, 
regardless of different samples, different methodologies and different time periods. 
 






Methodology Main conclusions 










Significant improvement in 
output, operating efficiency, 
investment, dividends 
payment and employment. 
Significant reduction in debt 
levels. 
 
    








Profitability doubles after 
privatization, sales and 
efficiency also increase but not 
so significantly. Increase in 
investment followed by a debt 
and employment decrease. The 
returns on the shares prove to 
be higher than the average 
returns of the market.  
 
   
    
    






    








Methodology Main conclusions 









State owned and mixed 
ownership firms are 
significantly less profitable 
and productive than private 
firms. Mixed firms do not 
prove to be more profitable 
than state owned companies, 
full private ownership is a 
necessary condition for 
efficiency gains.  
 
   
    
    
    
    
     
Boardman and 
Vining (1992) 
Canada 1986 OLS 
Regression 
Partially privatized companies 
are more profitable than 
companies fully owned, there 
is an ownership effect that can 
be isolated from the 
competition effect.  
 
    
    
     
Chen, Firth, 






When control is transferred to 
a private company there are 
positive effects on 
performance. When the 
transfer is made to an entity 
controlled by the Government 
there are no significant 
changes in performance. 
 
 
   
    
    










Greater concentration of 
ownership is associated with 
higher levels of profitability 
and productivity. Foreign 
investment and investment that 
is not associated with banks 
contribute more to 
performance. 
 
    
    
    














Results show significant 
improvements in profitability 
and a sharp decrease in debt 
and labor intensity, both in the 
short-term and the long-term.  
 
 












where verified in efficiency, 
profitability and reduced debt 
levels. The results show a 
modest increase in investment 
and a significant decrease in 















Methodology Main conclusions 












Restructuring and changes in 
corporate governance are 
determinant for performance 
improvements. Foreign 
investment contributes to 
performance improvements 




   














Privatized firms that remain 
controlled internally rarely 
begin restructuring processes, 
while firms that admit new 
shareholders grow faster. 
 
  
   
     






Growth rates associated with 
productivity and profitability 
increase significantly while 
sate participation decreases. 
 
   







Deciding which companies to 
privatize will depend on a 
combination of financial 
characteristics and specific 
electoral considerations.  
 
    
    
    






Results suggest the existence 
of a seasoning effect. The 
success of a privatization 
process requires preparation 
and favorable political and 
economic conditions.   
 
    
    









As long as the Government 
holds a stake in the company 
that enables it to retain control, 
the organization will not 
function as a private company. 
Authors suggest a concept of 
ultimate privatization. 
 
   
    
    
     







Private participation in 
companies controlled by the 
Government still contributes to 
block political interests and to 




   








Methodology Main conclusions 
     







Layoffs are an important 
source of performance 
improvement. However, 
before privatization, state 
owned companies worked with 
excess workers and wages 
exceeded market values.  
 
   
    







State owned companies are 
less efficient than mixed 
enterprises and private firms. 
Mixed companies prove to be 
less efficient than private 
firms. 
 
    
    
     
Megginson, 







Results show improvements in 
real output, capital investment, 
dividend payment and a 
significant decrease in debt 
levels. While a significant 
change in executives was 
observed, no evidence of a 
reduction in the level of 
employment was found.  
 
   
   
    












Survey Results show significant 
improvements in output, 
efficiency, profitability and 
investment as opposed to a 
significant debt reduction after 
the privatization process, both 
for transition and non-
transition economies.   
  
    
    
    
     




Privatized firms show 
significant improvements in 
profitability, efficiency and 
reduced debt in line with the 
existing literature but state 
owned companies show a very 
similar result. Author suggests 
the existence of a spillover 
effect. 
 
    
    















Methodology Main conclusions 
     






The authors suggest the 
existence of an inverted U-
shaped pattern between state 
ownership and firm 
performance, where an optimal 
combination between state 
ownership and private 
investors might exist. 
 
    
    
    
     
Tian (2000) China 1998 Propose a 
theoretical 
model 
Performance of private firms is 
significantly higher than 
performance of partially 
privatized firms. Additionally, 
the researcher concludes that 
in most cases company value 
decreases in the presence of a 
state participation.  
 
    
    
    
     






Ownership concentration has a 
different impact depending on 
the type of shareholder. Private 
participation and domestic 
entities’ participation are 
significantly associated with 
performance improvements, 
while state participation does 
not seem to provide any 
changes. 
 
   
    
    
    








Privatized firms have 
significant improvements in 
profitability and firms with 
more than 50% of private 
equity show superior results 
when compared with 
companies in which 
Government retains control. 
 
   
    
    











3 – Hypotheses 
3.1. Before-after performance comparison. 
The hypothesis that there is an improvement in company performance after the 
privatization process takes place will be tested. Following the literature presented in the 
previous section, we can expect performance improvements after the privatization 
process. The results for our sample of European companies should be in line with most 
of the studies in this subject that report significant improvements after selling shares to 
private investors. Privatizing companies reduces state intervention, thus contributing for 
more competition. To succeed without sate protection companies need greater managerial 
accountability and a results oriented strategy, requirements that should improve 
performance in the long run (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). 
H1 - Performance is higher in privately owned firms. 
 
3.2. Firm performance as a positive function of private ownership. 
In our analysis we will test whether increasing private participation can be linked 
to improvements in company performance. As already mentioned private participation 
increases at the expense of a decrease in state participation. Consequently, we can expect 
less intervention in company’s management and a growing ability to follow performance 
strategies over the traditional political objectives (Gupta and Dinc, 2011). Therefore, an 
increase in private investment should have a positive impact in company performance. 
This hypothesis has been tested in the existing literature with successful results for a 




of private investment (Gupta, 2005). We will try to verify the existence of similar results 
for our sample of European companies. 
H2 - Firm performance is a positive function of the level of private ownership. 
 
3.3 Inverted U-shaped pattern: Private ownership and firm performance. 
Some authors suggest the existence of an optimal combination between state 
participation and private equity in order to maximize the performance of privatized firms 
(Sun, Tong and Tong, 2002). This approach questions if the full privatization option, that 
gathers a wide consensus among researchers regarding better performance (Boardman 
and Vining, 1989), is the best solution for the previously sate owned companies. Sun, 
Tong and Tong (2002) investigate this situation by testing the existence of an inverted U-
shaped pattern between performance and state participation, which can support the 
previous line of thought. Their results suggest that an excessive state participation 
involves an interference in the organization’s management and control of its destinies. 
Too small a stake provides insufficient support to the difficulties that these companies 
will be facing, due to market competition. Our study will test the existence of a similar 
pattern between performance and private participation for European privatized firms. 











4 – Data 
The basis of the present study are non-financial companies owned by the central 
governments in Europe that have sold equity to private investors within a defined time 
range, in this case between 2001 and 2011. Partial privatization and full transfer of the 
company to the private sector have both been considered for this analysis. Working with 
partial privatization provides a wider scope on the effects of the privatization process, 
according to Gupta (2005), Sun, Tong and Tong (2002) and Tian (2000).  
Privatization data was collected from the Privatization Barometer Database, which 
provides information about privatizations in Europe. We used this data base to confirm 
which companies where privatized within our time range and to collect data, namely the 
percentage of equity sold to private investors and the year that the sale took place. All 
privatized firms between 2001 and 2011 were selected for this study. For comparison 
purposes, and following Gupta (2005), a second group of companies was also selected. 
This group consists of 100% state owned companies from the same European context of 
the previous companies, with comparable data within the time range of our study. For this 
control group, the data source used was the European Public Companies Database from 
SPC Network (Strategy and Policy Consultants Network). This database was used to 
identify sate owned companies and to verify its shareholder structure.  
The sample resulted in two groups of 125 firms (i.e. 250 firms), from 26 European 
countries. For each firm, yearly financial statements from 2001 to 2011 were collected, 
resulting in an initial sample of 2,500 firm year observations. Accounting information 
was collected from the Amadeus database. In some cases it was necessary for analysis 
purposes, to complement this information with the annual reports of the companies. These 




The information collected from financial reporting consists of the value of annual Assets, 
annual Liabilities, Equity, current Assets, current Liabilities, net Profit, annual Sales, total 
number of employees, operating Income and Income before taxes. Collecting information 
for each year of our sample was not possible for a number of companies. For this reason 
some firms have more information available than others, leading the panel to be 
unbalanced. Additionally, information on workforce for each year of our sample was not 
available for some companies. However, this limitation does not prevent us from 
following the author's methodology. Missing data regarding employment was estimated 
based on time average. After eliminating companies with incomplete information, the 
total accounting data collected for this study consists of 2,315 financial years, including 
the study group and the control group.  
Following Gupta (2005), the present study focuses on two categories of business 
performance: profitability and productivity. The impact of the privatization process on 
employment levels will also be addressed, as some researchers have questioned the 
positive effect of the privatization process in this variable (Malatesta, 2001). Annual sales 
and return on assets information is used as proxies for profitability. The annual profit 
considered to calculate the return on assets is the Operating Income of each company. We 
measure productivity with two ratios, the average product of labor, which is calculated by 
the ratio of sales to the total number of workers and the return to labor ratio, calculated 
by the ratio of operating income to the number of workers. The total number of workers 
in each year will be used to assess the impact of the privatization process on employment. 
The use of debt at each moment is calculated by the ratio between total liabilities and total 
assets value, providing information on possible changes in financing patterns for each 





Some of the variables used in the study are presented as logarithms in order to 
control for skewness in the data. Description of main variables used in this study and the 
source from where the information has been collected is presented in table II. Table III 
presents descriptive statistic of those variables. 
Table II – Variables description and information source 
Variables Description Source 
assets_log Logarithm of  the book value of assets as of the end Amadeus/company 
 of fiscal year, reported by the firm. reports 
average Ratio of annual sales to Labor. Amadeus/company 
product  reports 
debt/assets Ratio of total liabilities to annual assets. Amadeus/company 
  reports 
employees_log Logarithm of the total number of employees at the Amadeus/company 
 end of the year reports 
priv Variable that lies between 0 and 100, measuring the Amadeus/SPC 
 the percentage of equity that is private in a firm in a Database 
 given year.  
roa_log Logarithm of the Ratio of annual operating income Amadeus/company 
 to annual assets plus one. reports 
return to labor Ratio of annual operating income to labor. Amadeus/company 
  reports 
sales_log Logarithm of the annual sales generated by an Amadeus/company 
 enterprise from its main activity. reports 
   












Table III – Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs (firms) Mean Std. Dev. Min Máx 
      
Panel A: Privatized Firms           
      
assets (millions) 1,225 (125) 13,900.00 33,000.00 1.60 263,000.00 
average product 1,225 (125) 449.42 802.98 1.20 10,520.56 
debt/assets 1,225 (125) 0.57 0.23 0.02 2.89 
employees 1,225 (125) 22,662.91 54,485.40 13.00 502,763.00 
priv 1,225 (125) 0.40 0.34 0.00 1.00 
roa 1,225 (125) 0.07 0.12 -0.56 0.83 
return to labor 1,225 (125) 70.13 193.93 -330.17 2,575.61 
sales (millions) 1,225 (125) 7,404.31 18,100.00 0.57 167,000.00 
      
Panel B: State owned Firms           
      
assets (millions) 1,090 (125) 2,816.66 10,900.00 0.03 97,700.00 
average product 1,090 (125) 338.05 803.60 0.00 16,958.30 
debt/assets 1,090 (125) 0.57 0.43 0.00 3.54 
employees 1,090 (125) 6,680.41 18,985.51 2.00 156,529.00 
roa 1,090 (125) 0.03 0.16 -3.51 0.74 
return to labor 1,090 (125) 58.91 305.88 -1,892.34 5,685.01 
sales (millions) 1,090 (125) 839.64 2,263.84 0.00 23,800.00 
      
Panel C: All firms           
      
assets (millions) 2,315 (250) 8,660.42 26,200.00 0.03 263,000.00 
average product 2,315 (250) 396.98 805.02 0.00 16,958.30 
debt/assets 2,315 (250) 0.57 0.34 0.00 3.54 
employees 2,315 (250) 15,137.67 42,468.67 2.00 502,763.00 
priv 2,315 (250) 0.21 0.32 0.00 1.00 
roa 2,315 (250) 0.05 0.14 -3.51 0.83 
return to labor 2,315 (250) 64.85 252.90 -1,892.34 5,685.01 
sales (millions) 2,315 (250) 4,313.38 13,600.00 0.00 167,000.00 
      
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. All data was obtained from 
the Amadeus database and the companies’ financial reports. Refer to table II for variables definitions. All 
values are in thousands of euros unless stated otherwise. 
 
This table includes both privatized companies and companies completely owned 
by the state. The number of observations corresponds to the number of financial years 




followed by the standard deviation to evaluate dispersion around de mean value. 
Minimum and maximum values are also presented to evaluate the range of each variable. 
We can observe that European privatized firms are quite big, with an asset value average 
of 13,900,000,000 euros. This value is significantly higher than the asset value average 
of 2,816,660,000 euros, reported by state owned companies. Privatized companies also 
sell more than state owned companies, with average annual sales of 7,404,308,000 euros 
compared to 839,637,700 euros of state owned companies. Regarding profitability there 
is a 4% difference between the two groups. Privatized companies have a 7% average 
















5 – Methodology 
We will use two different approaches to test the proposed hypotheses. To test the 
first hypothesis, we investigate changes in performance before and after privatization. In 
order to evaluate this transition, the average for each variable is calculated and then the 
hypothesis for the mean difference between the two periods will be tested, using the t-
student statistic. The two periods are separated using the first sale of equity to private 
investors as a reference. Thus, for the firms in our sample that were privatized, i.e. 125 
firms, the first period is comprised with all the yearly observations from the period 
beginning in 2001 until the beginning of the year the first sale was made. The second 
period is set from that year onwards until 2011. 
The second approach, follows Gupta (2005) methodology. In this approach we 
evaluate the impact of changes in the percentage of private equity in company 
performance by creating the variable Priv. This variable measures the percentage of the 
company capital held by private owners at the end of each year. The second hypothesis 
is then tested by mean of a baseline panel regression model. We will investigate the 
significance of the priv variable explaining each performance measure. The results are 
calculated using the following model: 
Equation 1: yit = β1 + β2privit-1 + β3debt_assets it-1 + β4assets_log it-1 + eit 
Where yit represents each of the independent variables analyzed, more precisely 
annual sales, return on assets, labor productivity, return to labor and employment. The 
priv variable, as already mentioned, represents the fraction of privately owned capital, 
debt_assets is the debt to assets ratio used to evaluate financing patterns and the 
assets_log the control variable for firm size. All independent variables are lagged one 




Finally, the existence of an optimal combination of state participation and private 
participation in the ownership structure of a privatized company is investigated (H3). We 
follow Sun, Tong and Tong (2002) study to test if this is the case. Using the priv variable 
we will check for a maximum absolute value in a quadratic function that combines the 
different variables of company performance with the percentage of private shares at each 
moment. If the a coefficient of each polynomial function in the form f(x) = ax²+bx+c is 
negative, and the b coefficient is positive, this reveals the existence of a maximum 
absolute value for the quadratic function. If such a result is found then the inverted U-
shaped pattern hypothesis is accepted. Meaning that there is an optimal combination 
















6 – Results 
6.1 – Before-after performance comparison 
In Table IV we can verify the performance changes before and after the 
privatization process for our sample of partially privatized and fully privatized 
companies. We can find this methodology in studies like Megginson, Nash and van 
Randenborgh (1994) and Boardman, Laurin and Vining (2000). The following results are 
obtained by calculating the mean of each variable and testing for the mean difference 
between the two periods, using the t-statistic mean difference test. The post privatization 
period is defined using the first sale of shares to private investors as a reference. 







of difference in means 
    
Profitability    
  Sales 13,120 13,787 13,559*** 
 (0,126) (0,087) (0,072) 
  Return on assets 0,053 0,066 0,062** 
 (0,006) (0,003) (0,003) 
Productivity    
  Average product 327,789 512,652 449,421*** 
 (22,598) (32,619) (22,942) 
  Returns to labor 49,363 80,929 70,132*** 
 (8,162) (7,249) (5,541) 
  Employees 7,786 8,214 8,068*** 
 (0,120) (0,075) (0,064) 
Financing    
  Debt/Assets 0,588 0,556 0,567** 
 (0,013) (0,007) (0,007) 
Assets and investment    
  Assets 13,565 14,352 14,083*** 
 (0,135) (0,087) (0,074) 
    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. Sales is the annual sales from the main activity of the firm. Return on assets is the ratio of 
annual operating income to annual assets. Average product is the ratio of annual sales to labor. Returns to 
labor is the ratio of annual operating income to labor. Employees is the total number of employees at the 
end of the year. Debt/assets is the ratio of total liabilities to annual assets and Assets is the book value of 




Results show with a significance level of 1% that the mean difference for the 
measures of performance is positive and statistically significant between the two periods, 
more precisely for annual sales, average product and returns to labor.  Return on assets 
shows a similar result at a 5% significance level. These results show that the performance 
of companies improved after allowing private investors to enter the capital structure. In 
general terms partially privatized and fully privatized firms show an increase in sales, 
become more profitable and achieve higher levels of productivity, in line with the results 
found in Gupta (2005). This result confirms our hypothesis of better performance 
following private investment in companies of our sample. 
We can verify that the annual assets show an increase in the post privatization 
period. With a significance level of 1% the positive difference between averages of the 
two periods is significant. Since Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994) report an 
increase in capital investment following the privatization process, this result might be a 
sign of investment and indicate that companies grew after the privatization process. 
The number of employees also show a significant positive difference after 
privatization took place, with a significance level of 1%. This result shows that more 
employees where hired following private investment. We could expect a different result 
since in most cases the privatized processes implies restructuring of the company, which 
can lead to reduction of personnel (Malatesta, 2001). This happens because state owned 
companies generally operate with more staff than they need and with above-average 
wages (La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999). In the present analysis, contrary to these 
prior studies, it is found that the level of employment increases after the privatization 
process. In this case the effect of reducing personnel due to restructuring may have been 
absorbed by the effect of company growth. This might have led to an increase in the total 




normally encountered in these processes. The annual assets result combined with the 
higher numbers off employment seems to give some support to this line of thought. Again 
this information is in line with our hypothesis of improvements after the privatization 
process. More assets and more employees indicates growth for the companies in our 
sample, presumably as a result of better performance. 
Regarding the debt/assets ratio which represents the debt utilization of firms, the 
average difference is negative and statistically significant. The results show with a 5% 
level, a reduction in debt usage patterns after admitting private investors to the ownership 
structure. As discussed in the literature review section, most studies show significant 
changes in financing patterns, as private investment seems to contribute to a lower level 
of debt, bringing new resources both at management level and financial level, to the 
companies. The negative difference between the mean values of the two periods of our 
sample indicates a reduced level of indebtedness after privatization. This result verifies 
the expected reduction in the level of debt that seems to be associated with the 
privatization process.  
Overall these results are in line with the existing literature and confirm, within the 
mean difference test methodology, that there is actually an improvement in performance 
of firms after a partial privatization or full privatization process. However, this type of 
analysis, before and after privatization performance, faces some limitations regarding 
changes in the overall sate of economy during the years of our sample or changes in the 
life cycle of some of the organizations (Gupta, 2005). For this reason we will test the 






6.2 – Private participation 
Table V shows the results of the multivariate regression model, i.e. the impact of 
changes in private participation in the ownership structure on the different performance 
measures used in this study. 
Table V – Panel data regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES sales_log roa_log laborprod returnlabor employees_log 
      
L.priv 0.566*** 0.026*** 78.040 2.172 0.126 
 (0.101) (0.007) (59.010) (17.640) (0.104) 
L.debt_assets 0.740*** -0.035*** 12.450 2.399 0.475*** 
 (0.093) (0.007) (54.520) (16.290) (0.096) 
L.assets_log 0.887*** 0.002* 47.500*** 9.620*** 0.663*** 
 (0.012) (0.001) (7.205) (2.153) (0.013) 
Constant 0.250 0.040*** -246.900*** -63.690** -1.653*** 
 (0.158) (0.012) (92.350) (27.600) (0.163) 
      
Observations 2,061 2,060 2,061 2,061 2,061 
R-squared 0.760 0.021 0.027 0.011 0.614 
F-statistic 2171,870 14,540 18,79 7,760 1092,690 
P-value 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
      
    Notes: Huber-White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, ** and *** refer to significance at        
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The dependent variable in the first regression (1) is sale_log, measured 
as the logarithm of annual sales of main activity of the firm. The dependent variable in the second regression 
(2) is roa_log, measured as the logarithm of return on assets plus one. The dependent variable in the third 
regression (3) is laborprod, measured as the ratio of annual sales to labor. The dependent variable in the 
fourth regression (4) is returnlabor measured as the ratio of annual operating income to labor. The 
dependent variable in the fifth regression (5) is employees_log, measured as the logarithm of total number 
of employees at the end of the year. Refer to table II for independent variables definitions. 
 
This analysis includes both the study group and the control group where the priv 
variable takes the value zero because these companies are completely owned by the state. 
The dependent variable y assumes for each regression, the different performance 
measures that we want to study. The variable debt_assets represents the use of debt by 
the companies and the variable assets_log, the assets logarithm, is used as a control 




The first regression in Table V represents the impact of changes in private 
participation in the annual sales of companies, presented as its logarithm. Results show 
that with a significance level of 1% the priv variable is statistically significant for 
explaining the changes in annual sales of privatized firms. The positive coefficient reveal 
that on average, an 1% increase in the percentage of capital held by private investors lead 
to an increase of 57% in annual sales of these companies in the following periods. This 
confirms the hypothesis that more private investment has a positive impact in this measure 
of firm performance. Regarding the use of debt, this variable is also significant with a 
significance level of 1% to explain the dependent performance variable. The positive 
coefficient allows us to conclude that the increase in indebtedness of privatized firms has 
a positive impact on the annual sales of companies in the next period. This result seems 
to indicate that companies gathered resources to finance investments that had a positive 
outcome, which may be reflected in increased annual sales. Further, the annual assets of 
the companies also show as statistically significant as an explanatory variable for annual 
sales with a significance level of 1%. The positive coefficient suggests that increasing 
assets have a positive impact on annual sales, which can be explained by the fact that 
most of the asset increases result from investment policies. The combination of these three 
variables prove to be statistically significant to explain de dependent performance 
variable, the F test for the global significance of the model shows Prob > F = 0,000 as a 
result. This means that increases in private participation combined with more debt use 
presumably for investment, and more assets, contribute to more sales in the following 
period.  
The second regression of Table V shows the impact of private investment in the 
return on assets ratio of the privatized companies. At a significance level of 1% the priv 




that increasing private participation for our sample results in an increase in returns on 
assets in the following period. On average, a 1% increase in the percentage of capital held 
by private investors leads to an increase of 2,6% in returns on assets. Again, this confirms 
our hypothesis of higher performance as a result of private investment. Regarding the use 
of debt this variable assumes a negative coefficient which suggests a decrease in return 
on assets on the following period as a consequence of companies borrowing money. This 
variable, with a significance level of 1%, proved to be statistically significant to explain 
the return on assets of the companies in our sample. This result shows that companies 
have to take in to consideration smaller returns on the short term when they gather 
financial resources for new investments. The annual assets show as statistically 
significant for the dependent variable with a positive impact in the next period, but only 
at a 10% significance level. Never the less, this result is in line with the previous 
regression. The F test confirms the global significance of this model (Prob > F = 0,000) 
which confirms that these variables combined are statistically significant explaining the 
dependent performance variable. Return on assets depends on private investment, debt 
use and asset value all together. Private investment provides the company with more 
resources, equivalent to the value of shares sold to the new investors. This reduces 
financial needs and correspondent costs, increasing the results of the company and its 
ability to grow. On the other hand, using more debt implies borrowing costs that reduce 
the company profitability. 
The third regression of Table V examines the relationship between labor 
productivity and changes in private investment for the companies in our sample. Changes 
in private percentage did not reveal a statistically significant impact on the productivity 
of workers within the current analysis. This result does not confirm our hypothesis of 




may be explained by the need for restructuring, already mentioned in the literature that 
privatized firms usually face (Gupta and Dinc, 2011). This restructuring process generally 
requires some layoffs in the short term, therefore the positive effect on labor productivity 
may require a longer time range than the one presented in our analysis to be confirmed. 
The impact of debt use in this performance variable did not show as statistically 
significant, which means that for this group of companies the debt use did not seem to 
influence the productivity of workers. The annual assets show an opposite result, which 
suggests the existence of a significant positive relationship between the company's growth 
and the productivity of its workers. The two variables seem to be linked together as more 
productive workers brings growth to the company and bigger companies provide better 
conditions that may stimulate productivity. The F test suggests that the model is globally 
significant explaining the dependent variable. This means that although the two first 
variables are not significant in their isolated impact, its combined effect with the others 
variables prove to be significant explaining the dependent variable. 
The fourth regression in Table V represents the impact of changes in private equity 
on the returns to labor. The results are similar to previous regression. If we can’t confirm 
the existence of a positive significant impact in labor productivity resulting from private 
investment for the time period of our sample, we also shouldn’t expect for such a 
confirmation regarding returns to labor because it relies on the same premise, the 
employees. Once again this result does not confirm our hypothesis of better performance 
regarding returns to labor. 
Finally the fifth regression in table V represents the level of employment in the 
organizations of our sample. We can observe that changes in the percentage of private 
equity in privatized companies of our sample do not prove to be statistically significant 




level of 1% debt use shows as statistically significant. With a positive coefficient, this 
result suggests that an increase in debt level leads to increases in the number of employees 
working for the companies in the following period. This may come as a result of financing 
investments that have a positive return. This positive outcome leads to the growth of the 
organization as a whole, which may result in increases in the employment numbers as 
well. The statistically significant result for the annual assets with a positive impact on the 
number of employees comes in line with the previous result, strengthening the above 
reasoning. The F test confirms that the model is globally significant despite the result of 
the priv variable. There isn’t a consensus around the privatization process impact in 
employment and related performance measures among the researchers in this subject. 
Studies like Gupta (2005) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998) report increases in 
employment level and better performance regarding employment performance measures. 
On the other hand, studies like La porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), Malatesta (2001) 
and D’Souza and Megginson (1999) report that there is a decrease in the employment 
level and related performance measures after the privatization process takes place. The 
reduction of personnel is actually described as one of the necessary measures to increase 
performance in the short term.  
Overall these results show that the privatization process leads to significant 
improvements in annual sales and in returns to assets of the privatized companies, in line 
with the existing literature on this subject. This conclusion is valid both for partial 
privatization and full privatization scenarios. On the other hand, the results also show that 
the admission of private investors in state owned companies do not seem to bring short-
term improvements to the performance variables related to employment. It would be 
necessary to extend our time range of analysis to confirm the effects on these variables. 




improvement of state owned companies when they become open to private investment. 
As already discussed in the literature review, this improvement comes from a greater 
ability for the management to define targets for the organization with less state 
interference. Managers have more leeway to pursue performance goals and sustainability 
instead of the traditional political objectives that guide most of state owned companies 
(Gupta and Dinc, 2011). There is more room for a result oriented strategy which in most 
cases requires politically unpopular measures. However, these same measures are 
essential to the performance of any company. 
6.3 – Inverted U-shape pattern 
Table VI shows the results regarding the pattern followed by the performance 
measures used in this study, when combined with different levels of private participation 
in the ownership structure. The goal is to verify the existence of an optimal proportion of 
private equity that maximizes the performance of the companies in our sample. This 
proportion of private shares would also represent an optimal combination with state 
participation, as the rest of the equity would be sate owned. Such a result would confirm 
the hypothesis that partial privatization is a better solution than full privatization 










Table VI – Inverted U-shaped pattern results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES sales_log roa_log laborprod returnlabor employees_log 
      
Panel A: All firms     
      
L.priv 2.788*** 0.167*** 753.9*** 167.2** 1.135*** 
 (0.328) (0.0283) (254.4) (72.22) (0.362) 
L.priv2 -2.701*** -0.172*** -821.7*** -200.6*** -1.227*** 
 (0.393) (0.0329) (270.7) (77.15) (0.422) 
L.assets_log 0.859*** -0.000145 39.02*** 7.550*** 0.651*** 
 (0.0110) (0.00117) (5.688) (1.511) (0.0124) 
L.debt_assets 0.806*** -0.0305*** 32.56 7.309 0.505*** 
 (0.143) (0.0112) (37.41) (14.88) (0.0930) 
Constant 0.505*** 0.0566*** -169.4** -44.76** -1.537*** 
 (0.150) (0.0141) (66.51) (19.92) (0.161) 
      
Observations 2,061 2,060 2,061 2,061 2,061 
R-squared 0.765 0.035 0.032 0.015 0.616 
F-Statistic 2348,030 13,940 32,420 20,760 966,090 
P-value 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 
Panel B: Privatized firms     
      
L.priv 0.802** 0.103*** 964.9*** 272.5*** -0.00278 
 (0.344) (0.0312) (274.5) (72.60) (0.397) 
L.priv2 -1.162*** -0.127*** -1,022*** -299.0*** -0.202 
 (0.411) (0.0344) (288.1) (79.61) (0.449) 
L.assets_log 0.857*** -0.00222 25.67*** 1.353 0.709*** 
 (0.0105) (0.00167) (7.177) (1.897) (0.0126) 
L.debt_assets 0.924*** -0.0408** 69.17 16.97 1.078*** 
 (0.182) (0.0182) (79.20) (20.53) (0.186) 
Constant 1.014*** 0.112*** -39.88 17.41 -2.453*** 
 (0.143) (0.0233) (84.74) (21.80) (0.166) 
      
Observations 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 
R-squared 0.858 0.026 0.030 0.024 0.738 
F-Statistic 2811,640 5,180 19,030 8,960 1207,170 
P-value 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
      
Notes: Huber-White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The dependent variable in the first regression (1) is sale_log, measured 
as the logarithm of annual sales of main activity of the firm. The dependent variable in the second regression 
(2) is roa_log, measured as the logarithm of return on assets plus one. The dependent variable in the third 
regression (3) is laborprod, measured as the ratio of annual sales to labor. The dependent variable in the 
fourth regression (4) is returnlabor measured as the ratio of annual operating income to labor. The 
dependent variable in the fifth regression (5) is employees_log, measured as the logarithm of total number 





The results are calculated using the variable priv, which represents the private 
participation in the capital structure of the company at each moment, to build a quadratic 
function that relates this information with performance measures (Sun, Tong and Tong, 
2002). This type of function enables us to analyze the existence of a maximum or a 
minimum absolute value depending on the sign of the coefficients of variables priv and 
priv2. Priv2 is the priv variable squared. The calculations follow the presented equation, 
where f(x) assumes each performance variable: f(x) = priv² + priv + constant. 
  Since all the coefficients of variable priv are positive and all the coefficients of 
variable priv2 are negative for the sample including all firms, these results confirm the 
existence of a maximum absolute value in the function for all the five equations. This 
confirms the existence of a potential optimal point that maximizes each performance 
measure, which leads to the conclusion that there might be an optimal combination 
between private investment and state shares for our sample. This optimal combination 
maximizes annual sales, return on assets, returns to labor, labor productivity and 
employment, thus confirming our hypothesis. In Panel B of Table VI we can verify similar 
results for the sample of privatized companies, except for the variable measuring 
employment. As already discussed, there isn’t a consensus around the effect of the 
privatization process in the employment level that leads to consistent results. Overall this 
outcome is in line with the Sun, Tong and Tong (2002) study that we use as a guide line, 
as we can verify by one of the concluding comments of their research: “Too much 
government holding of SOE (State Owned Enterprises) shares means too much control 
and interference in the economic operations of SOEs. Too little government holding 
means too little support from the government to pull the SOEs out from their difficulties”.  
  These results reinforce the idea that partial privatization may be the best solution 




2002). An optimal allocation of shares between the two parties seems to combine the 
advantages of private management with specific resources of the public sector and still 
be effective in reducing excessive intervention by the state and the imposition of political 
















7 – Conclusion 
The results confirm the three hypotheses proposed by this study. Companies 
privatized reveal superior performance in the period following the first private investment 
in the capital structure. Additionally, the performance of privatized companies depends 
on the percentage of private investment since it has been confirmed that an increase of 
this percentage reflects positively in the performance measures. Finally, there seems to 
be an optimal combination between the state participation and private investment that 
maximizes the performance of privatized firms, suggesting that state and private investors 
can co-exist with valid contributions in the capital structure of previously state owned 
companies. 
The results referring to employment related performance measures, more 
precisely productivity, returns and changes in the total number of employees do not have 
a consistent outcome in our analysis. Still, this situation falls within the literature on the 
subject as already discussed. Although there is not a significant relationship of these 
measures with private investment for our sample, the positive outcome of the remaining 
performance measures and the other tests seem to be acceptable to support our 
conclusions. 
These results for a sample of the European context, which is the scope of this 
study, are consistent with the existing literature on the subject, as they confirm an 
improvement in company performance resulting from the privatization process that does 
not seem to depend on the geographical area in which this process takes place. Therefore, 
this study strengthens the general application of the existing knowledge on this subject 
that points towards significant improvements resulting from the reduction of state 




Additionally this study helps to reinforce the need to privatize existing state owned 
companies in European rescued countries, given the current context of adversity. This 
context is characterized by scarcity of resources, high unemployment, and a scenario of 
persistent economic recession accompanied by a high level of taxation due to budgetary 
constraints. In this difficult situation the efficiency, sustainability and profitability of 
enterprises becomes even more important, especially for those that spend public 
resources. 
In this study some limitations were found regarding the availability of information 
that restricted the full application of the methodology used in Gupta (2005). The 
information available on the number of employees in the databases and financial reports 
that we used is limited for a number of companies and accounting information was not 
available for all the years in our sample. The researcher uses two additional analytical 
perspectives, more precisely investment and rotation of directors and evaluates its impact 
on company performance. However, given the difficulties in gathering information about 
capital expenditures, research and development costs and detailed information about 
executives, these features were not implemented in our study. Still, working with the 
information available we have tried to make this study and its findings as robust as 
possible. 
Regarding future research and in coherence with the reported limitations, it would 
be important to gather the necessary conditions for the full implementation of the 
methodology that constitutes the basis of this study, in order to further strengthen its 
conclusions. Additionally, we should consider extending our sample to a larger set of 
companies, as more information leads to even more robust conclusions. Using a longer 
time range would help to confirm the effects on employment levels and employment 




process in these performance variables may not be visible within the time range selected 
for this study. It would be interesting to compare the application of this methodology in 
different contexts, in particular comparing the results of the original study conducted with 
a sample of Indian companies with the findings of this study using a European sample. 
This comparison could be extended by applying this methodology to other relevant 
geographical contexts like China or Russia where the state traditionally has a relevant 
position and privatization processes exist in sufficient number for analysis purposes.  
All studies seem to confirm that less sate interference leads to better company 
performance, this does not necessarily mean a complete absence of state participation. 
Whether this positive effect is perceivable immediately or it takes some time to be 
identified, in the long run all evidence suggests that performance will have a positive 
outcome, regardless of the geographical contexts or the method used to evaluate the 
performance changes. Differences among researchers seem to rely more in the scale of 
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